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Objective:  This  study  empirically  analyzes  the  effects  of  public  information  about  the  pharmaceutical
R&D  process  on  the  market  valuation  of  the  sponsoring  ﬁrm.  We  examined  the  market’s  response  to
scientiﬁc  news  and  regulatory  decisions  about  an  antiobesity  drug,  rimonabant,  and  the  effects  on  the
sponsoring  company  (Sanoﬁ-Aventis)  and  its incumbent  competitors  (Abbott  and  Roche).
Methods:  Event  study  methodology  was  used  to test  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  market  response.  We
covered  the  full  life  cycle  of  rimonabant  (1994-2008),  using  a data  set  of  daily  closing  price  and  volume.
Results:  The  results  suggest  that  scientiﬁc  news  in  the initial  stages  of  the  drug  R&D  process  (i.e.,  drug
discovery,  preclinical  and  clinical  trials)  had  no signiﬁcant  effects.  However,  news  related  to regulatory
decisions,  such  as  recall  or safety  warning,  had  signiﬁcant  negative  effects  on  the  company’s  market
value.  No  spillover/contagion  effects  on  competitor  ﬁrms  were  detected.
Conclusion:  Market  reactions  occur  at the  time  when  the  regulator  takes  decisions  about  drugs.  Scientiﬁc
news,  even  those  of  high-impact,  may  pass  unnoticed.
© 2011  SESPAS.  Published  by Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All  rights  reserved.
¿La  innovación  en  medicamentos  contra  la  obesidad  afecta  a  los  mercados  de
valores?  Un  análisis  de  estudio  de  eventos
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Objetivo:  Este  trabajo  analiza  empíricamente  los  efectos  de  la  información  pública  sobre  la  I+D  en la
valoración  de  mercado  de  una  empresa  farmacéutica.  Examinamos  la  respuesta  del  mercado  a  las  noticias
cientíﬁcas  y  a las  decisiones  de  regulación  de  un  medicamento  para  la  obesidad,  el rimonabant  (Sanoﬁ-
Aventis),  sobre  la  propia  compan˜ía  y sobre  sus  competidoras  (Abbott  y Roche).
Métodos: Se  aplicó  la metodología  de  estudio  de  eventos  para  contrastar  la hipótesis  de  ausencia  de
respuesta  del  mercado.  Cubrimos  el  ciclo  de  vida completo  del  rimonabant  (1994-2008),  utilizando  una
base de  datos  de  precio  y volumen  de  negociación  diarios  al cierre.
Resultados:  Los  resultados  sugieren  que  las  noticias  cientíﬁcas  en  las  etapas  iniciales  del  proceso  de  I+D  (es
decir, el  descubrimiento  del fármaco  y  los ensayos  preclínicos  y clínicos)  no  tuvieron  efectos  signiﬁcativos,
pero  las  noticias  relacionadas  con  las decisiones  regulatorias  (retirada  o alerta  de  seguridad)  sí  tuvieron
efectos  negativos  signiﬁcativos  en  el valor  de  mercado  de  la empresa.  No  se detectaron  efectos  cruzados
en las  empresas  competidoras.
Conclusión:  Las reacciones  de  los  mercados  se  producen  en  el  momento  en  que  el  regulador  toma
decisiones  sobre  medicamentos.  Las  noticias  cientíﬁcas,  incluso  las  de  gran  impacto,  pueden  pasar
desapercibidas.
011  S© 2
ntroduction
Empirical evidence analyzing the effects of public information
n a speciﬁc new drug R&D process on the market valuation of the
ponsoring ﬁrm and on its competitors remains limited. Changes in
rices, particularly abnormal returns, are the market’s reaction to
nanticipated news. Some changes in prices are due to new phar-
acologic information on the mechanism of action of the drugs,
heir therapeutic advantages or problems. The medical commu-
ity interprets stock price changes as reﬂecting safety problems
ith the drug,1 and some doctors are involved in investment
dvice activities and monitoring the regulatory process.2–4 Diverse
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: jvperez@dmc.ulpgc.es (J.V. Pérez-Rodríguez).
213-9111/$ – see front matter © 2011 SESPAS. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All righ
oi:10.1016/j.gaceta.2011.07.028ESPAS.  Publicado  por Elsevier  España,  S.L.  Todos  los  derechos  reservados.
factors may  affect stock prices, including product approvals,
product failures, a robust pipeline, research milestones achieved,
data and information on pipeline status, the hiring and reten-
tion of quality scientists and staff, and research collaborations
and alliances with external entities.5 Hence, it is expected that
ﬁnancial markets should respond to clear signs of success or
disappointment, as reﬂected in news announcements concerning
the drug R&D process.
In the present article we  investigate the relationship between
the R&D process of a speciﬁc drug and stock prices. Firstly,
we test whether the stock prices for the pharmaceutical com-
pany that sponsors the drug respond to the information arising
from the drug R&D process. Testing this hypothesis will establish
whether scientiﬁc information stemming from research and drug
discovery, preclinical tests, clinical trials and regulatory author-
ity decisions [such as the Food & Drug Administration (FDA),
ts reserved.
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uropean Medicines Agency (EMA) and National Institute of Health
nd Clinical Excellence (NICE)] about its market use (commercial-
zation) or withdrawal have any effects on stock prices. Secondly,
e test whether the stock prices of direct pharmaceutical competi-
ors react to the same information. This test allows us to determine
hether there is any evidence of spillover effects on the manu-
acturers of substitute products,6-8 or whether the intra-industry
mpact of a drug’s withdrawal might produce a contagion or a
ompetitive effect.6,9
We  examined the R&D cycle of the antiobesity drug rimonabant
Acomplia® or Zimulti®), manufactured by Sanoﬁ-Aventis, which
onstitutes an excellent case study. In just a few years, this drug
egan and ended a history of great promise, serious doubt and
esounding failure, evolving from being the brightest star in the
ompany’s ﬁrmament to disappearing completely from the galaxy.
imonabant was sold in the European Union but was not authorized
y the FDA in the USA and was withdrawn from the European mar-
et by the EMA  after 2 years on sale due to safety problems. There
ere only two clearly identiﬁable competitors on the market: sibu-
ramine (Reductil®), made by Abbott Knoll, and orlistat (Xenical®),
y Roche, and consequently the estimation of spillover effects was
traightforward.
he linear model for the drug R&D process:
he rimonabant case
In general, in all R&D processes, there are two  particularly signif-
cant time points, those of discovery and innovation. In the case of
he pharmaceutical industry, there tends to be a substantial inter-
al between these time points because the R&D of new drugs is an
xtremely lengthy (and costly) process.
The formal R&D process of a drug is the movement in the
rug pipeline toward ﬁnal approval. The R&D process, which is
trictly regulated at every stage by the corresponding governmental
uthority, can thus be viewed as a linear model,10 characterized by
tages including research and drug discovery, preclinical tests, pre-
linical trial commencement, investigational new drug submission,
linical trials (phases I, II and III), process development in parallel
ith product tests, and ﬁling (ﬁg. 1).
From the discovery of a new drug (patent) to the innovationapproval) time, the distribution of the entry lag varies substan-
ially. The testing and approval process takes considerable time,
ometimes a long time, depending on the severity of the disease and
any other factors such as the available therapies and the efﬁcacy
Experimental development
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ig. 1. Formal drug R&D process schematized by the linear model (adapted from
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and safety claims of the new drug. After product approval by gov-
ernmental authorities, commercialization may begin. Clinical trials
will continue to be performed, as the drug may be found to have
serious adverse effects, forcing the authorities to have it withdrawn
from the market.
Rimonabant event history
Obesity is a pandemic health problem worldwide. There are
currently one billion overweight adults, of whom at least 300 mil-
lion are obese.11 The potential market for antiobesity treatment
is, therefore, considerable.12 Despite the very limited effectiveness
of pharmacological approaches,13 the pharmaceutical industry is
continually investigating new drugs.14–16
In 1997, two appetite-reducing drugs, fenﬂuramine and dexfen-
ﬂuramine, were withdrawn from the market after serious adverse
cardiac valve effects were reported,17–23 and in 2001, only two  new
products were marketed, orlistat and sibutramine, both of which
were approved in 1998.
In 2001, clinical trials began of a new drug, rimonabant, pro-
duced by the company Sanoﬁ and patented in 1994.
Rimonabant acts on cannabinol receptors to suppress the
appetite and was  described as “one drug inspired by another”.24
However, its entire life cycle lasted only 14 years, from 1994 to
2008. Rimonabant went from being viewed as a potential block-
buster and star medicament in 2001, to being withdrawn from the
European market in late 2008. The high hopes aroused by this drug
were due not only to its weight loss effects but also to its ability to
improve the analytical results of patients with metabolic syndrome
and/or diabetes. Rimonabant’s failure was due to its adverse psychi-
atric effects, doubling the risk of depressive disorders. From 1994 to
2008, there were scientiﬁc and regulatory events. The results of the
main clinical trials before 2007 (table 1) were published in the most
inﬂuential and prestigious medical journals but, from 2007-2008,
tended to appear more in specialist journals, except the STRADI-
VARIUS trial, which examined the drug’s effects on atherosclerosis.
Some of these trials were of only limited interest due to their
small sample size, which was  the case of SERENADE, with only 278
patients.
The ﬁrst setback in the rimonabant process took place in Febru-
ary 2006, when the FDA delayed approval and denied authorization
for the drug to be used as an aid to smoking cessation and demanded
further safety trials. One week previously, JAMA had published the
partial results of the RIO-North America 2-year follow-up clinical
trial. Although these appeared to be satisfactory, there were grey
areas; in particular, half of the patients had been lost to follow-up.
The large-scale RIO-diabetes trial had produced promising results
in January 2002 and June 2005, but the partial results issued in
November 2006 gave investors a nasty surprise when safety prob-
lems and adverse psychiatric effects were detected. Other clearly
negative events occurred in 2007 and 2008: the non-authorization
by the FDA (June 13, 2007); the report by the British Medicines
and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency of adverse events –ﬁve
deaths and over 700 cases of averse reactions between early 2006
and May  2008 (June 3, 2008); the poor results of the STRADIVARIUS
clinical trial (July 16, 2008); and ﬁnally, the withdrawal of rimon-
abant from European markets ordered by the EMA  (October 23,
2008).
In June 2006, sales of rimonabant began in Europe, where
it was  marketed under the name of Acomplia®. The drug was
eventually withdrawn in 2008, having accumulated total sales
of D57 million in the ﬁrst half of that year, of which D34
million corresponded to the second quarter. Table 2 shows
annual ﬁnancial data for Sanoﬁ-Aventis, Roche and Abbott from
2006 to 2008.
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Table 1
Clinical trials in phase III from 2001 to 2008 with available results, and publication of results
Phase III program Clinical trial
(with available
results)
Length Patients Date of publication of results
RIO Program (four clinical
trials)
RIO-North
America
2-year study 3.040 Feb 15, 2006. JAMA32
RIO-Europe 2-year study 1.507 April 16-22, 2005 (1 year follow-up). Lancet41
July 2008 (2-year follow-up). Eur Health J42
RIO-Lipids 1-year study 1.036 Nov 17, 2005. NEJM43
RIO-Diabetes 1-year study 1.045 Nov 11, 2006. Lancet44
STRATUS Program (three
clinical trials, but only one
with available results)
STRATUS-US 10-week study
with 42-week
follow- up
787 Partial results: March 7-10, 2004 in the American
College of Cardiology’s 53rd Annual Scientiﬁc Session,
New Orleans, LA45
July 28, 2006
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT00358228
Reduced heart attacks and
strokes, or aid in preventing
and treating type 2 diabetes
SERENADE 6-month study 278 August 4, 2008. Diabetes Care46
Atherosclerosis STRADIVARIUS 18-month
study
839 April 2, 2008. JAMA47
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CIO: Rimonabant In Obesity; STRATUS: Studies with Rimonabant and Tobacco U
TRADIVARIUS: Strategy To Reduce Atherosclerosis Development Involving Admin
For the manufacturer, rimonabant represented a relatively mod-
st contribution to total revenue, reaching a maximum of 0.28%
n 2007 in comparison with the 1.72% achieved by the competing
roduct marketed by Roche. Nevertheless, the rate of net sales of
imonabant was rising while that of Roche’s orlistat was  falling. In
007, sales of rimonabant increased by 171% with respect to 2006
nd in 2008 and, until the product was withdrawn from the mar-
et, sales continued to increase. In contrast, orlistat sales fell by 5%
nd 12%, respectively, in 2007 and 2008. These ﬁgures suggest that
 substitution effect was taking place.
R&D expenses on Acomplia® were D41 million in 2008, rep-
esenting a minimal 0.61% share of Sanoﬁ-Aventis’ total R&D
xpenses.
ata and methodsata
In our study we matched two databases, the ﬁrst contain-
ng stock prices and stock market indexes, and the second, news
able 2
ome important ﬁnancial variables for each company. Millions $US (corrected by inﬂatio
Variables Years 
Total net sales 2006 
2007 
2008
Total  net incomea 2006 
2007 
2008 
Total  R&D expenses 2006 
2007
2008 
Antiobesity drug’s share of total net sales (%) 2006 
2007 
2008 
ll information, except antiobesity drug’s share of total net sales, was obtained from th
US  values of Sanoﬁ-Aventis and Roche were obtained by considering the following mea
.079,  for 2006, 2007 and 2008, respectively. All data were corrected by the CPI (=2000, so
ntiobesity drug (rimonabant, xenical and sibutramine, respectively) on total net sales.
PI:  consumer price index; OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developm
a Total net earnings for Abbott.
b Quantity of foreign sales.RENADE: Study Evaluating Rimonabant Efﬁcacy in Drug Naïve Diabetic Patients;
on of Rimonabant - the Intravascular Ultrasound Study.
about scientiﬁc matters related to rimonabant (database of events).
Our ﬁrst data set consisted of the daily closing prices adjusted
for dividends and splits of the daily prices of the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) pharmaceutical companies Abbott Labora-
tories, Sanoﬁ (before its merger with Aventis in December 2004),
Sanoﬁ-Aventis, and Roche Holding AG-Genusschein, a Zurich-listed
company. We  also formed an equally-weighted pharmaceutical
stock portfolio index by using all pharmaceutical NYSE-listed com-
panies as a proxy of the market index. The data were obtained from
Bloomberg and covered the whole life cycle of the drug studied. The
prices were transformed into logarithms to compute continuous
returns.
Our second data set consisted of daily news related to rimona-
bant’s clinical trials obtained from medical journals, from the FDA
and EMA, and from other public sources including Factiva. For the
period 2002-2008, covered by Factiva,  we  detected 1,133 news
items (most of them were repeated) by using the search crite-
ria “rimonabant” and “clinical trial”. Then, we  ﬁltered these news
items to include only those reporting results presented at medical
congresses or published in academic journals as well as relevant
n, CPI base year= 2000). Period 2006-2008
Sanoﬁ-Aventis Roche Abbott
31,903 25,222 19,194
33,914 28,902 21,523
35,225 31,150 23,852
4,946 6,948 1,466
6,869 8,987 2,995
5,484 9,393 3,943
4,981 5,580 1,964
5,485 6,589 2,076
5,846 7,661 2,181
0.11 2.08 1.53b
0.28 1.72 NA
0.26 1.40 NA
e annual and ﬁnancial reports of each company, expressed in local currency. The
n annual exchange rates: $US/EUR: 1.256, 1.371, 1.471; and CHF/$US: 1.252, 1.198,
urce OECD). Antiobesity drug’s share of total net sales is percentage of sales for the
ent; NA: not available.
-Valcá
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cientiﬁc news and reports published in the Financial Times, the
all St Journal,  the New York Times and other leading newspapers.
Table 3 displays the 46 events in the R&D lifecycle of rimonabant
s modelled in this study; 31 of these events (67%) were reported
n Factiva.  Some partial or complete results from clinical trials were
resented at medical congresses (seven events: numbers 8-9, 10,
2, 14, 20, 26). Scientiﬁc journals published results from preclinical
nd clinical trials (26 events: numbers 2-6, 8-10, 12-14, 16-18, 20,
3, 25, 28, 35-36, 38-40, 42 and 44). The decisions and statements
ade by the FDA in the USA and the EMA  in the EU constituted nine
vents (numbers 19, 21-22, 27, 29, 31, 37, 41 and 45) and the NICE
ecommendation made in the UK is event number 43. In addition,
here were six events of announcements by the company related
o this drug (numbers 7, 15, 24, 26, 32 and 46).
Only two of the 46 events (numbers 18 and 31 in table 3) show
ome degree of ambiguity regarding the a priori expected sign.
vent 18 was the publication of the results of the RIO-North Amer-
ca 2-year follow-up clinical trial in JAMA, which were only partially
ositive (February 15, 2006). After authorization was refused in
orth America, in June 2007, the advisory committee of the EMA
ssued a warning on 19th July 2007: event 31 (expected nega-
ive sign), but did not withdraw the drug in Europe, unlike what
ccurred in the USA (expected positive sign).
vent study methodology
An abnormal return is deﬁned as the component of the return
hat is not due to systematic inﬂuences (market-wide inﬂuences).
n other words, the abnormal return is the difference between the
ctual return and what is expected to result from market move-
ents (normal return).
This methodology, with its many extensions, has become an
mportant tool in ﬁnance and economics.25–29 In the present study,
e followed the methodology deﬁned by MacKinlay.29 Firstly,
e estimated the market model for each security (Sanoﬁ-Aventis,
bbott, Roche) for the estimation window, deﬁned as 300 trading
ays. The abnormal return was calculated for each stock as the daily
rediction error for the event window, deﬁned as ±5 days around
he critical date. Critical dates are the 46 event dates displayed
n table 3. Tests were also carried out with shorter windows (±2
ays), while longer windows (±21 days) were discarded because
hey might lead to overlapping among some events. Once the indi-
idual abnormal returns were obtained, they were aggregated in
he interval deﬁned by the event window to obtain the cumulative
bnormal returns (CAR) for each stock (i.e., CAR(-5.0) represents
he cumulated effect from 5 days before the event date to the event
ay). The t-statistic was used to test the hypothesis that a CAR is sta-
istically different from zero (two-tailed test). We  also calculated
he change in the market value of the company on the NYSE by
sing the expression proposed by Dowdell et al30 and performed
dditional robustness checks, i.e., by excluding both Sanoﬁ-Aventis
nd Abbott and Roche from the index, because the attenuation bias
ight also affect the estimates of the competitors.31
We  analyzed spillover effects on the stock returns of Abbott and
oche, which are direct competitors, as well as on the ﬁrms com-
eting in the innovation race for new antiobesity drugs since 2007,
uch as Pﬁzer and Merck & Co.
esults
he impact of R&D news on pharmaceutical ﬁrms’ stock valuesSigniﬁcant market response effects were detected for only 8 of
he 46 events (numbers 18-20, 29, 33, 42, 45 and 46 in table 3).
f these events, three were positive and ﬁve were negative. Thesercel / Gac Sanit. 2012;26(4):352–359 355
events constituted three pairs of consecutive, related events, and
all occurred during the period 2006-2008. The robustness analysis
showed no signiﬁcant changes. Detailed results of the estimated
models are available as Annex in this article on line.
The signiﬁcant events were the following:
1) Reuters reported that the FDA rejected the use of rimonabant for
smoking cessation (February 17, 2006). The ofﬁcial letter from
de FDA to Sanoﬁ was  sent 5 days later, on February 22. The mar-
ket reacted signiﬁcantly that day (February 22, CAR (−5, +2) =
−6%).  Neither ﬁltration of the news, nor the publication in
JAMA32 2 days before of worse-than-expected partial results of
the RIO-North America clinical trial had any impact. Only the
FDA ofﬁcial letter disclosure had an effect. The FDA’s decision
may  well have been based on the news published in JAMA on
February 15. The fall in the market value of the company was
around $3.8m.
2) At the 55th scientiﬁc session of the American College of Cardiol-
ogy, on March 12, 2006, good results were presented on the use
of rimonabant in abdominal obesity (review of phase III clini-
cal trials), along with data from the general practice-based IDEA
(International Day for the Evaluation of Abdominal Obesity). The
market reacted with a CAR(-5.0) = 7%, and the market valuation
of the company increased by $1.6m.
3) The FDA advisory committee refused to approve the drug (June
11, 2007). This event produced signiﬁcant negative effects in
the CAR from the event date to 5 days later. On the event day
there was a drop of around 4%, signiﬁcant at 10%. The maximum
drop in the market value of the company ($15.88 m)  occurred
on event day +3, and was the largest decrease in the total set of
studied events. The total accumulated drop in the event window
was  13%, which was signiﬁcant at 1% (the t-statistic was  equal
to -3.94). In June 2007, the stock valuation of Sanoﬁ-Aventis at
the NYSE fell from $48 to $40 (in Europe, from 71 to 60 Euros).
4) The EMA  published a safety warning on the adverse psychiatric
effects of the drug (July 19, 2007). The EMA  advisory committee
warned of problems of depression affecting patients taking this
drug, although it continued to be commercialized.
5) On November 13, 2007, the European Commission endorsed the
positive opinion to extend the summary of product character-
istics for rimonabant. The market anticipated the good news,
reacting positively from 5 days earlier, with CAR varying from
CAR (−5, −5) = 3% to CAR(-5.0)=7%, both statistically signiﬁcant
at 1%.
6) On June 9, 2008 the ﬁnal update of the RIO-Diabetes trial was
disclosed. Its poor results affected the market prices on the same
and the next day, with a CAR (−5, +1) = −6%. The fall in the mar-
ket value of Sanoﬁ-Aventis was nevertheless small (-$0.67 m on
June 9, 2008).
7) Rimonabant was  withdrawn (October 23, 2008). On day 0 there
was  a positive effect signiﬁcant at 10%; nonsigniﬁcant effects
in the next 2 days, and a large positive CAR on days +3 and +4,
reaching 14% on October 29 (day +4).
8) All trials with rimonabant were suspended (November 5, 2008).
The accumulated fall in value reached 9% the day after the event,
signiﬁcant at 5%.
Neither scientiﬁc announcements nor regulatory decisions had
spillover effects on the manufacturers of substitute products.Discussion
Only eight of the 46 events in the rimonabant story had effects
on the stock returns of the company; six of them were related to
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Table 3
Relevant events in the R&D process of rimonabant
Number Factiva Event date Expected sign
on abnormal
returns
Item in the
drug R&D
process
Description of the event
1 No August 22,
1994
+ Drug discovery Publication of an article reporting that the ﬁrst highly selective CB1
receptor antagonist (SR141716) has been discovered by Sanoﬁ48
2 No July 1, 1997 + Preclinical trial Publication of an article reporting that rimonabant selectively reduces
the  intake of palatable food or drink in mice49
3 No April 12, 2001 + Preclinical trial Publication of an article in Nature reporting that leptin-regulated
endocannabinoids are involved in maintaining food intake50
4 No January 23,
2002
+ Clinical trial First results of the RIO Diabetes phase III clinical trial
5  No October 24,
2002
Preclinical trial Online publication that rimonabant produces a marked loss in body
weight that is maintained up to the end of the 6-week treatment in
diet-induced obese mice51
6 No March 20,2003 + Preclinical trial Online publication of an article reporting that the cannabinoid CB1
receptor antagonist SR141716 increases Acrp30 mRNA expression in
the adipose tissue of obese fa/fa rats and in cultured adipocyte cells52
7 Yes February 17,
2004
+ Company press
release
Announcement of good results of a phase II clinical trial after 52 weeks
8  Yes March 7-10,
2004
+ Clinical trial Presentation of the results from the STRATUS-US trial at the American
College of Cardiology’s 53rd Annual Scientiﬁc Session45
9 Yes August 29,
2004
+ Preclinical trial Presentation of positive results of the RIO-Europe trial at the European
Society of Cardiology, Munich
10 Yes November
7-10, 2004
+ Clinical trial Presentation of the 2-year results of the RIO-North America trial at the
American Heart Association
11 Yes December 5,
2004
- Press release Interview with the editor of JAMA published in the New York Times.
Doctors urge caution about rimonabant
12  Yes March 8, 2005 + Clinical trial Presentation of the results of the RIO-Europe trial at the American
Society of Cardiology
13  Yes April 16, 2005 + Clinical trial Publication of the partial results of the RIO-Europe trial in the Lancet41
14 Yes June 12, 2005 + Clinical trial Presentation of the partial results of the RIO Diabetes trial at the
Annual Meeting of the American Diabetes Association
15 Yes  June 23, 2005 + Company press
release
Announcement by Sanoﬁ-Aventis that its application has been
authorized in the USA
16  No November 9,
2005
Preclinical trial Online publication of results reporting that the cannabinoid CB1
receptor antagonist SR141716 inhibits cell proliferation and increases
markers of adipocyte maturation in cultured mouse 3T3 F442A
preadipocytes53
17 No November 17,
2005
+ Clinical trial Publication of the results of the RIO-Lipids clinical trial in the NEJM.
Effects of rimonabant on metabolic risk factors in overweight patients
with dyslipidemia43
18 Yes February 15,
2006
? Clinical trial Publication of the results of the RIO-North America clinical trial after 2
years of follow-up in JAMA.32 Mixed results
19  Yes February 17,
2006
- Regulatory
decision
Report by Reuters that the FDA has rejected the use of rimonabant for
smoking cessation. The FDA’s ofﬁcial letter to Sanoﬁ sent on February
22 (5 days later). Approval is delayed, and the FDA refuses to approve
rimonabant for smoking cessation. More safety studies are needed
20  Yes March 12, 2006 + Clinical trial 55th Scientiﬁc Session of the American College of Cardiology.
Presentation of the results of rimonabant for abdominal obesity
(review of phase III clinical trials). Data from the general
practice-based International Day for the Evaluation of Abdominal
Obesity
21  Yes April 27, 2006 + Regulatory
decision
The EMA  (CHMP) advisory committee approves rimonabant for the
treatment of obesity and overweight
22  Yes June 19, 2006 + Regulatory
decision
The EMA  authorizes commercialization in 25 EU countries
23  No July 28, 2006 Clinical trial STRATUS-US clinical trial for smoking cessation ﬁnishes
24  No October 27,
2006
+ Company press
release
Note from Sanoﬁ reporting positive results of the RIO-Diabetes trial
25  No November 11,
2006
+ Clinical trial Publication of the partial results of the RIO Diabetes trial in the Lancet44
26 Yes December 5,
2006
+ Company press
release
Sanoﬁ presents a study at a world scientiﬁc conference in South Africa
27  Yes February 12,
2007
- Regulatory
decision
The FDA delays 3-month decision on rimonabant
28  Yes February 17,
2007
- Clinical trial The Lancet publishes four pessimistic comments on the RIO Diabetes
trial (event number 25): Lambert et al., 2007; Roberfroid, 2007;
Shapiro and Singer, 2007; Randall et al., 2007.
29  Yes June 11, 2007 - Regulatory
decision
The FDA Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs advisory committee
withholds approval of rimonabant (Zimulti®) to the US FDA for use in
obese and overweight patients with associated risk factors.
30  Yes June 30, 2007 - Press release The Wall Street Journal reports that Sanoﬁ has withdrawn rimonabant
application in the US for obesity
31  Yes July 19, 2007 ? Regulatory
decision
The EMA  advisory committee issues a warning on depression, but
allows commercialization to continue
32  Yes September 17,
2007
+ Company press
release
Sanoﬁ-Aventis announces plans for new clinical trials on diabetes
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Table  3 (Continued )
Number Factiva Event date Expected sign
on abnormal
returns
Item in the
drug R&D
process
Description of the event
33 Yes November 13,
2007
+ Regulatory
decision
The European Commission endorses the positive opinion to extend the
Summary of Product characteristics for Acomplia®
34 Yes November 16,
2007
- Clinical trial Article published in the Lancet54 recommending: “increased alertness
by  physicians to these potentially severe psychiatric adverse reactions”
35  No February 15,
2008
+ Clinical trial Publication of an article favorable to rimonabant in Diabetes Care, with
no new data55
36 Yes March 15-17,
2008
+ Preclinical trial Publication of a study on the positive effects of rimonabant for treating
alcoholic and nonalcoholic fatty liver (experiments in mice) in Cell
Metabolism
37 Yes March 26, 2008 + Regulatory
decision
NICE includes rimonabant among its recommendations
38  Yes April 2, 2008 - Clinical trial Publication of the 18-month results of the STRADIVARIUS clinical trial
in  JAMA. Results are not good47
39 Yes April 18, 2008 + Clinical trial Publication of a favorable article resulting from the RIO Europe trial in
Eur  Heart J42
40 No May  12, 2008 + Preclinical trial Publication of results indicating that rimonabant positively modulates
lipid proﬁle, reduces circulating neutrophils and monocytes, and
attenuates platelet activation and as the release of proatherosclerotic
chemokines, reducing cardiovascular risk in Zucker rats56
41 No June 3, 2008 - Regulatory
decision
Publication of a report by the UK regulatory board, the MHRA, on the
adverse events of Acomplia® (rimonabant): ﬁve deaths and over 700
cases of adverse reactions from 2006 to May  2008
42  Yes June 9, 2008 - Clinical trial Final update of the RIO Diabetes trial
43  Yes June 25, 2008 + Regulatory
decision
Approval of rimonabant treatment by NICE
44  No August 4, 2008 + Clinical trial Publication of the results of SERENADE in Diabetes Care
45 Yes  October 23,
2008
- Regulatory
decision
Withdrawal of rimonabant by EMA
46  Yes November 5,
2008
- Company press
release
Announcement by Sanoﬁ-Aventis of the suspension of all trials with
rimonabant
STRATUS-US trial: Smoking Cessation in Smokers Motivated to Quit; RIO: Rimonabant in Obesity; FDA: Food and Drug Administration; MHRA: Medicines and Healthcare
products Regulatory Agency; NICE: National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence; EMA: European Medicines Agency; CHMP: Committee for Medicinal Products for
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egulatory decisions, only two corresponded to clinical trial news,
nd ﬁve were negative.
The publication of the results of clinical trials in scientiﬁc jour-
als had no signiﬁcant effects, with a few exceptions. The events
ound to be signiﬁcant corresponded to decisions by the regula-
ory authority (to withdraw from the market) or by the company
tself (to suspend all trials with the drug). The positive effects on
he market of the safety warning issued by the EMA  on rimonabant
July 19, 2007) can be attributed to investors’ fearing that the drug
ould be withdrawn from the market following the USA’s refusal
o authorise it the previous month (June 11, 2007), where CAR is
egative.
Rimonabant’s withdrawal (October 23, 2008) apparently had a
ositive effect on Sanoﬁ-Aventis. This very surprising result could
e due to market anticipation of the withdrawal and might reﬂect
 reaction to other good news for the company, speciﬁcally, the
pproval by the FDA of a new treatment for children with diabetes
n October 29.33
In general, the effects were immediate, or there was a lag
f at most 1 day following an event. Adjustments thus seem to
e rapid, which is consistent with the efﬁcient market hypothe-
is. Nevertheless, the market did not discount the information on
cientiﬁc discoveries until the regulator reacted with a concrete
ecision, suggesting that investors are unable to foresee the con-
equences of some scientiﬁc news items and do not adjust their
xpectations correctly, as was the case, for example, in February
006. In this context, the growing interest in Wall Street in hir-
ng doctors as investment advisors and as scientiﬁc translators is
nderstandable.3,4,34 However, these results contrast with the lit-
rature showing that scientiﬁc information matters for physicians’
rescription choices.35 Our results show that there is a missing Administration of Rimonabant - the Intravascular Ultrasound Study.
link between scientiﬁc information and market valuation. In this
sense, the markets are not performing well in aggregating informa-
tion. The unique scientiﬁc event (the 55th scientiﬁc session of the
American College of Cardiology), which had signiﬁcant impacts on
returns, was  similar to the other scientiﬁc news in the way it was
released to the media and spread by press agencies. We  tracked
every event in Factiva: how many times and which press media
echoed the event. We  conclude what has an impact on marked val-
uations is the type of information (regulatory or scientiﬁc) rather
than the way it is communicated to the press.
Another study using event study methodology36 found no sig-
niﬁcant effects, or at most only a weak level of signiﬁcance, of the
meetings of the FDA advisory committee on the stock valuations of
pharmaceutical companies. The authors interpreted this as a sign
of market efﬁciency. In our case, while the clinical trials do not
seem to have surprised the stock exchange, regulatory decisions
had a signiﬁcant impact. No positive scientiﬁc news item had a sig-
niﬁcant effect on stock values; the ﬁrst promising results of the
pre-clinical stage, the clinical trials (from 2002-2006), the autho-
rization for the product to be commercialized in Europe and in other
countries, and its recommendation in the NICE guidelines had no
signiﬁcant impact. The stock market had already discounted these
expectations of success. As in other studies on the pharmaceutical
market,37 when using Filson’s model we found that the negative
effects of bad news were more intense than the positive effects.38
Failures have a greater impact on stock values than do the successes
of discovery.Models of innovation or technological races usually assume that
due to patents, experience economies or marketing strategies, the
ﬁrst ﬁrm to introduce a new product or process reaps dispropor-
tionate proﬁts relative to imitators or follow-on innovators.39,40
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herefore, each ﬁrm is anxious to ﬁnish the development of a new
roduct or process in ﬁrst position relative to competitors (hence
he term “race” associated with the literature on the topic) and
s ready to make the necessary investments and decisions to that
nd. In our case, three companies were involved around 2007 in the
obesity pill race” against Sanoﬁ-Aventis: Pﬁzer (drug CP-945598),
erck & Co. (taranabant) and Alizyme (cetilistat). Our aim was
ot to measure spillovers in this prospective race, but to measure
pillover effects on incumbent drug marketers. Therefore, in this
tudy we analyzed the market reactions of Sanoﬁ-Aventis and of the
wo companies that marketed antiobesity drugs before rimonabant
as approved. Those incumbent drugs had low efﬁcacy for weight
eduction. We  found no empirical evidence of any spillover effects.
here was no contagion effect of bad news concerning rimonabant
n its competitors. Such an effect would be expected if there were
 “systemic concern for the safety of similar drugs or expectation
f higher regulatory costs”.9 Equally, we found no evidence of a
ompetitive effect, as would be expected if there were an oligopoly
uch that when one ﬁrm withdraws a product, its competitors gain
arket share and enjoy abnormal positive returns.
One limitation of our study is that Sanoﬁ-Aventis is a large com-
any and its stock value depends on many other drugs in its port-
olio and in the pipeline. Rimonabant constituted a modest propor-
ion of the company’s total sales, although by 2008 some 400,000
eople in 25 countries had taken the treatment. The lack of signif-
cant effects on the stock valuations of Roche or Abbott may  also
ave been due to the large size of both these companies, in which
ntiobesity drugs represent only a small proportion of total sales.
The market’s expectations of a new antiobesity drug depend on
any complex factors regarding the institutional context, includ-
ng the scope of public policies and the support for the latter from
he general population,12 as well as factors related to manufactur-
rs, markets and the sector. We  cannot account for everything, but
n the present study we have opened up a promising new line of
esearch in the area of healthcare economics.
What is known
The valuation of pharmaceutical companies in the stock
market is affected by scientiﬁc and regulatory events that
concern the company itself and the competition. Generally,
negative news has a stronger impact than positive news.
What this study contributes
Regulatory decisions about medicines to treat obesity exert
more inﬂuence on the stock market than scientiﬁc news.
There are no contagion effects in the market for obesity
drugs. Scientiﬁc and regulatory events concerning a drug do
not signiﬁcantly change the market valuations of competing
companies.
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